This page covers the validator incentive model and rollout path. For protocol mechanics, use How It Works.Documentation Index
Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.superform.xyz/llms.txt
Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.
Why validators get paid
Validators provide the PPS updates SuperVaults need to function safely. If updates stop or become dishonest, vault operations degrade quickly. Rewards exist to keep high-quality operators online and aligned with the network.Rewards
Vault curators pay upkeep fees in $UP for active oracle coverage. Those fees are distributed to participating validators. The intended model is:- more stake increases reward weight
- better participation preserves reward eligibility
- missed rounds reduce your effective payout
Staking
Phase 2 is expected to require validators to bond $UP. That bond is intended to:- serve as collateral for slashing
- weight participation and rewards
- enforce a minimum commitment to stay active
Slashing
Slashing is designed to penalize two categories of failure:- misreporting — signing materially incorrect or invalid PPS data
- insufficient participation — staying below required uptime / contribution thresholds
Insurance fund
A portion of validator economics is expected to seed an insurance fund intended to backstop depositors if oracle failures cause verified harm. It is not meant to cover:- unrelated smart contract bugs
- strategy market losses
- immaterial losses below a governance-defined threshold
Rollout phases
| Phase | Model | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Phase 1 | Permissioned validator set | Live |
| Phase 2 | Open bonding, slashing, insurance fund seeding | Planned |
| Phase 3 | Governance-managed validator rotation | Planned |